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COMMENTS
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL MAY MAKE AN OFFER
IRREVOCABLE
JUDSON A. CRANE*
Promissory Estoppel, as embodied in the Restatement of Con-
tracts Section 90, is a basis for holding binding promises followed
by foreseeable substantial detrimental reliance by the promisee, al-
though bargained-for consideration is lacking. This is an equitable
principle of long standing.' It has been applied frequently in cases
of donative promises,' including subscriptions to charitable institu-
tions.' Its application to commercial transactions, such as offers,
has been rare. Most business offers, if not in the form of options,
are promptly accepted by act or counter promise. Such offers are
normally made with a continuing desire that they be accepted. Once
there is acceptance and a contract formed, there is no occasion to
invoke promissory estoppel. Donative promises are not capable of
acceptance and consequently conventional contracts cannot result
from them.
The occasional case involves an offer, the terms of which embody
a unilateral mistake of the offeror, followed by detrimental reliance
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of The Law; A.B.
1905, Brown University; LL.B. 1909, S.J.D. 1915, Harvard University. Author, The
Law of Partnerships and Other Unincorporated Associations, 2nd Ed. (1952) ; Editor,
Cases on The Law of Damages, 3rd Ed. (1955) ; Clark and Marshall, The Law of
Crimes, 3rd Ed. (1927) ; Co-Editor [with I. Maurice Wormser], Cases and Other Ma-
terials on Private Corporations (1948)
. ; Co-Editor [with Calvert Magruder], Cases on
Partnership and Other Unincorporated Business Associations (1930).
I It is noted in the opinion of Justice Stern in Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196
Atl. 39 (1938), upholding a voluntary release of a co-lessee who vacated and went into
another business, that Dean Ames in his Lectures on Legal History, p. 143 finds that
before 1500 equity gave relief to plaintiffs who had incurred detriment on the faith
of defendant's promises.
A leading American case antedating Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932), enforcing a
gratuitous promise on which the promisee •
 had relied to her detriment, as the promisor
expected, is Ricketts v. Scothorn, .57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
2
 A familiar application is the sustaining as valid obligations of promises of pen-
sions to retiring employees, who quit work and refrain from competitive employment.
Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 571 (1932) ; Feinberg v.
Pfeiffer Company, 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1959).
While approving promissory estoppel in principle, some courts have found that
the continuing operation of a charity is such 'asked-for detrimental conduct as to
constitute real consideration. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank
of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) ; L & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsbcrg,
276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.2d 532 (1932). Cases applying promissory estoppel tri . various
situations are collected in 1 Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1957) § 140; 1 Corbin, Cdn-
tracts (1950) § 194 et seq.; 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) § 8086;
48 A.L.R.2d 1069 and prior annotations.
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on the part of the offeree,'which falls short of acceptance and a sub-
sequent effort on the part of the offeror who has now discovered his
mistake to retract the offer. Such a case was James Baird Co. v. Gim-
ble Bros. Inc' Gimble Bros. had made offers to prospective bidders
on a public building project to supply specified linoleum at a stated
price. In the computation of the quoted price, Gimble made a serious
mistake. The plaintiff, with no reason to know the mistake, used
Gimble's offer in preparing the low bid which resulted in the contract
award. The defendant discovered its error prior to the receipt of the
plaintiff's acceptance and revoked its offer. The plaintiff brought an
action for damages relying on the principles of promissory estoppel.
The District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, the opinion by L. Hand, J., stating that the application of
promissory estoppel was confined to donative promises. The holding
is rationalized by Corbin as follows:
If a promisee offers his promise as part of a bargain for
and in consideration of specified equivalent, the promisee
cannot make the promise binding by acting in reliance upon
it in a manner that constitutes no part of that specified equiv-
alent."
A similar problem was presented to the California Supreme Court
in Drennan v. Star Paving Company.' The plaintiff bid on a public
building, posting a bidder's bond. In making his bid as prime con-
tractor he relied on a bid of the defendant for the paving part of the
project, having no reason to know that it was the result of a mistake
in computation. The plaintiff was the lowest bidder and was awarded
the contract. He called upon the defendant to notify it of his accep-
tance of the offer for the paving sub-contract. Before he could manifest
his acceptance, he was told by the defendant the bid was a mistake
and was withdrawn. The plaintiff procured the paving from another
subcontractor at a price higher than the defendant's offer and sued for
the difference. A judgment below for the plaintiff was affirmed, the
Supreme Court relying on the principles of promissory estoppel to
hold the offer irrevocable. It appeared that defendant had reason to
expect its offer would be used by the plaintiff in making his bid as
prime contractor, and so it did induce "action of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee." The problem was
compared to that treated in Restatement, Contracts § 45, which deals
4 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). The decision is criticized in 28 Al. L. Rev. 419,
20 Va. L. Rev. 214.
5 1 Corbin, Contracts (1950) § 200.
a 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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with offers for unilateral contracts, made irrevocable after part per-
formance.'
The defendant contended, on the basis of certain California
decisions and Civil Code Provisions, that a contract could be avoided
by reason of unilateral mistake. The court, however, disposed of this
argument by noting that in the decisions cited the other party had
reason to know of the mistake and could be restored to status quo on
rescission. Neither fact existed in the case at bar. 8
As the transaction in the Drennan case was a construction contract
and a subcontract of part of the work, that case did not involve a
sale and would not be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
However, the Gimble case involving a sale would be subject to the
Code. Aside from the promissory estoppel issue, the question would
then be whether the supplier's bid was, under Section 2-205, a firm
offer though not expressly so designated. If, as in the Drennan case, it
could be shown that there was a trade usage under which suppliers
made bids on the eve of the prime contractor's submission of their
bids, with the intent and understanding that they should be used as
a component of the latter's bid, it might be held that by such usage
these offers were firm offers, irrevocable for a reasonable time.° What
effect if any the offeror's mistake would have would depend on the
general law of mistake."
The Drennan case appears to be a proper application of the princi-
ples of Promissory Estoppel. It should be distinguished from cases
in which there is no justifiable reliance, as where the promisee or
offeree knows of the offeror's mistake or has reason to know," or
cases in which the offeree does not promptly accept the offer, but in
effect rejects it by making a counter offer," or cases in which the
7 Cited by the Court as being on all fours was Northwestern Engineering Co. v.
Ellerman, 69 So. Bak. 397, 100 N.W.2d 879 (1943) which was similarly decided. The
opinion also cites Robert Gordon Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1941), a decision which while approving the application of promissory estoppel to
commercial cases found a lack of justifiable reliance, as the offeree knew of the offeror's
mistake.
See also Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
8 Restatement, Contracts 503 (1932) states that unilateral mistake is no basis for
rescission as against another party who has no reason to know of the mistake. There
is a significant trend to the contrary where the status quo can be restored after the
mistake is discovered and rescission sought. See St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135
Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500 (1916).
9 UCC i 2-205.
19 UCC 1-103.
55 Robert Gordon Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., supra note 7.
12 R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952).
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promisee alleges forbearance to act in reliance on the promise but does
not show that it was possible for him to do anything."
Is. Union Trust Co. v. Long, 309 Pa. 470, 164 Atl. 346 (1932).
•
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